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Abstract
This chapter rejects the common view that Hobbes saw reason as the slave of the passions. For Hobbes, the real conflict is not between reason and the passions but between our real good (self-preservation) and those apparent goods which threaten self-preservation. Reason, operating before deliberation, can inform deliberation by showing us when apparent goods undermine our real good. Reason can thus alter the images and opinions which our passions choose between. For Hobbes, reason is not the slave of the passions but the counsellor of the passions.
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Many writers claim that Hobbes saw reason as the slave of the passions. I find this interpretation misleading and suggest that it is often based on misreading. The key contrast is not between reason and the passions but between different passions – the passion for our real good, self-preservation, and passions for apparent goods which undermine self-preservation. By highlighting such clashes, reason can inform our deliberation.
But there is a problem: it is not clear whether Hobbes thought we would pick our real or apparent good where they clash. Reason’s strength thus remains uncertain. Ultimately, though, we can be confident that Hobbes does not see reason as the slave of the passions. I cautiously suggest a better summary: reason is the counsellor of the passions, at least for those few people who use reason in politics.
	Three brief methodological points are worth noting. First, anachronism – using modern words rather than Hobbes’s – often leads to misinterpretation. Anachronism is unavoidable, and can help (Blau 2012b), but it is dangerous (Skinner 2002: 49-51, 60-1). Misreadings of Hobbes often reflect anachronistic analogies such as reason being enslaved to the passions, or anachronistic viewpoints such as rational choice theory. 
To understand what authors meant, then, we should place them in their linguistic and political context. But also vital is textual context. My second methodological point is that many misinterpretations come from reading comments or passages out of context. 
My third methodological point is that we should indicate our uncertainty where firm conclusions are unwarranted. It is tempting to look for evidence which fits our views, then state our conclusions as if they must be right. It is harder but safer to compare different interpretations and then indicate if the evidence is ambiguous or unconvincing (Blau 2011; Blau 2012a: 144, 150-1). 




Hobbes talks of reason in four main ways: a set of principles, a faculty, a process, and an outcome. The set of principles is logic, which we apply with the faculty of reason, in a process of reasoning (also called computation, demonstration, ratiocination and reckoning), producing an outcome called “right reason”. The faculty of reason and the process of reasoning happen inside our heads, but the rules of logic and the outcome of right reason are external: an inference is or is not logically valid, objectively speaking. Reason distinguishes humans from animals, and reflects our ability to use language. But we often misuse language: we need clear definitions to deduce conclusions which follow necessarily from our premises. Even with clear definitions, though, anyone can fail to reason correctly. 
There is much textual support for this highly condensed summary (AW 37.4, 448; 39.7, 489; EL 6.4, 41; DC 2.1, 33; 18.4, 236-8; L 4.5-14, 26-9; 5, 31-7; 6.51, 44; 46.1-5, 458-9; DCO 1.2, 3; 4.1-4, 44-55; 5.2, 57; 6.15-17, 84-7; 20.6, 312; LNC 95, 191, 365, 450; EW7 183-4, 188). But the most detailed account, in De corpore, is not always helpful (Barnouw 2008, 43). We learn two main things, neither of which can easily be understood from De corpore alone. The first is that reasoning is like mathematical “computation”, which is the “addition and substraction” of properties (DCO 1.2-3, 3-5). Leviathan explains this better. In arithmetic, reason involves adding and subtracting numbers; in geometry, reason involves the same for lines and angles; in logic, it involves syllogisms and demonstrations; in politics, one adds “Pactions” to calculate what our duties are; and in law, one adds “Lawes, and facts, to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men” (L 5.1-2, 31-2).
What Hobbes means seems to be as follows. In arithmetic, when you add 2 and 2, you must get 4. If you don’t, your computation is wrong and conflicts with reason. In geometry, when you have a right-angled triangle whose shortest sides are 3 and 4 units long respectively, the third side must be 5 units long. To suggest otherwise is against reason. In logic, if your premises are that Socrates is a human and that all humans are mortal, you must conclude that Socrates is mortal, or your reasoning is wrong. In politics, if we have a paction (a covenant or contract) to obey the sovereign, and if pactions entail obligations, then we must have an obligation to obey the sovereign; to conclude otherwise violates reason. In law, if you know that citizens should pay taxes, and that a particular citizen has not, then you must agree that his actions are wrong. (The last two conclusions require extra premises, but these simple examples will suffice for here.) Hobbes often describes distortions of reason as “corruption” (Blau 2009).
Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy is thus an exercise in logic. For example, some laws of nature are syllogisms with the following format:

1)	Anything that violates peace should be prohibited.
2)	X violates peace.
3)	X should be prohibited.

I now turn to the second key idea in De corpore: Hobbesian deductions are often based on the very definitions of the words used. For example, Hobbes’s definitions of liberty and will imply that natural liberty is consistent with fear (L 6.53, 44-5; 21.1-2, 145-6). His reasoning is as follows:

1)	Every intentional action is the result of the will.
2)	Actions performed out of fear are intentional.
3)	Therefore, actions performed out of fear are the result of the will.
4)	A free man is he who is not stopped from doing what he has a will to do.
5)	Therefore, a man can perform actions out of fear and still be free.





3. The passions and deliberation
For Hobbes, everything is matter in motion, with humans motivated by passions – emotions, literally. To understand the relationship between reason and the passions, we need say no more about the nature of the passions (for which see James 1997: 126-36; James 1998: 26-9; Schmitter 2010; Krom 2011: 66-74). We can simply look at their place in deliberation. 
Deliberation is the interplay between trains of thoughts and passions, ending with a decision. When we consider doing something, we automatically imagine consequences, and undergo an “alternate succession of appetite and fear” about the action and its consequences; the last appetite before decision is called the will (EL 12.1-9, 70-73; DC 5.1, 69; 13.17, 152; L 6.49-57, 44-6; DH 11.2, 46; DCO 25.13, 408; LNC 357-8, 360, 389, 400-2). Consider someone thinking about stealing something. He desires the object but fears being caught. If his will is desire, he will try to steal the object; if his will is fear, he will not. 
Every intentional action results from deliberation and thus passion. “The passions of man ... are the beginning of all his voluntary motions” (EL 5.14, 39). Passion even underpins the intention to use reason: curiosity is the desire “to know why, and how”, and generates “a perseverance of delight in the continuall and indefatigable generation of Knowledge” (L 6.35, 42). As James (1997: 214) notes, Hobbes’s “conviction that passions not only initiate, but also sustain, an interest in reasoning” is quite distinctive. Hobbes himself expressed it well in a 1636 letter: “the extreame pleasure I take in study ouercomes in me all other appetites” (Correspondence vol. 1 letter 21, p. 37). 
 

4. Is reason the slave of the passions?
Having briefly outlined Hobbes’s accounts of reason, passion and deliberation, I now address the common but incorrect view that Hobbes treats reason as the slave of the passions. 
According to Paul Rahe (1994: 141-2), Hobbes

suggests that reason is the slave of the passions. Where a man’s “Trayne of Imaginations” is not a “wild ranging of the mind” but possesses a certain coherence reflecting guidance or direction, that coherence is rooted in “Passionate Thought” or “Desire.” As [Hobbes] puts it, “From Desire, ariseth the Thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that which we ayme at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean; and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our own power.” In short, “the Thoughts, are to the Desires, as Scouts, and Spies to range abroad, and find the way to the things Desired.” 

Rahe reiterates “reason’s enslavement to desire” several times (1994: 142-4, 388; Rahe 2008: 314). Such enslavement is also depicted by Hobbes scholars Howard Warrender (1957: 269), Jean Hampton (1986: 34-42), Vickie Sullivan (2004: 82, 92-4) and John Deigh (2013, 74), by political theorists Bertrand De Jouvenel (1957: 234) and Don Herzog (2006: 31), by moral philosophers J.D Mabbott (1953: 113) and Annette Baier (1986: 42), by legal philosopher Robert George (2008: 178-9), and in discussions of rational choice theory by political scientist Steven Rhoads (1985: 155, 281), sociologist Dennis Wrong (1997: 73-4), and economist Ken Binmore (2008: 3-4).
Other writers describe subservience without mentioning slavery. Michael Oakeshott sees reason as a “servant, revealing … the probable means by which desired ends may be attained” (1975: 94; see also 27). For Daniela Coli “reason … is nothing but an instrument of calculation at the service of the passions” (2006: 91; see also 83, 87, 91). “The intellect does not integrate with the passions”, writes Martin Bertman, but “serves them by attempting to satisfy particular wants or objects of desire” (1976: 535). According to Susan James, “reasoning only serves our passions”, and when the two conflict, “reason does not struggle against [the passions], but fights, so to speak, on their side” (2006: 210-1). Talcott Parsons states that for Hobbes, “reason is essentially a servant of the passions – it is the faculty of devising ways and means to secure what one desires” (1982: 96; see also 88, 97-8). According to Stephen Darwall, Hobbes depicts “instrumental reason in the service of the agent’s own ends” (1995: 79; see also 57-79). 
Finally, Janet Coleman (2000: 154-5) and Noel Malcolm (2002: 30) depict a similar relationship without mentioning slavery or subservience. For ease of exposition, though, I group all of these writers together, whether or not they mention “slavery”.


4.1. A Humean anachronism?
60 years after Hobbes died, David Hume described reason as the slave of the passions. Yet Hume has different notions of reason, of the passions, and of their relationship. And talk of slavery is misleading.
Hobbes and Hume agree that the passions, not reason, directly motivate intentional actions (EL 5.14, 39; Hume Treatise 2.3.3.1-3, 413-4). But this does not enslave reason to the passion. My belly button does not motivate my actions either, but I do not think anyone says that my belly button is the slave of my passions, even though it usually goes where my passions tell me to go. (Indeed, even if passion directly motivates action, passion could still serve reason if reason tells us what to do and if we have a consistent passion to follow reason. Neither Hume nor Hobbes says this, of course.) 
Much more explicitly than Hobbes, Hume describes two kinds of reason, demonstrative and probabilistic, dealing with logical and empirical matters respectively. “I believe it scarce will be asserted, that the first species of reasoning alone is ever the cause of any action” (T 2.3.3.2, 413). But probabilistic reason can easily affect our actions. Hume describes what Hobbes had called deliberation, but explicitly gives probabilistic reason a role; so, “as our reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation”. Even here, the actual impulse to act “arises not from reason, but is only directed by it” (T 2.3.3.3, 414). This, though, is not slavery.
Nor do Hume’s later comments sound like slavery. “The moment we perceive the falsehood of any supposition, or the insufficiency of any means our passions yield to our reason without any opposition” (2.3.3.6, 416). Similarly, once I see that certain actions are bad means to my ends, “they must become indifferent to me”, such that “whenever” I understand that mistake, “my longing ceases” (2.3.3.6, 417). When Hume writes that reason “can never pretend to any other office” than to “serve and obey” the passions (2.3.3.4, 415), this could include, as Irwin notes, “giving advice or prescriptions in opposition to passion” (2008: 585). True, slaves can give owners advice or prescriptions, but owners can do the same for slaves, as can people who are not in a slave/owner relationship.
Hume’s slavery metaphor is misleading (Karlsson 2006: 249; Allison 2008: 113). He tries so hard to avoid talking about passions and reason conflicting that he depicts a relationship of dominance, but what he describes sounds closer to two compatible faculties: a guide and a motivator. As we will see, this is close to Hobbes’s position. 
But Hobbes and Hume differ in at least two important ways. First, while Hume thinks everyone’s reason is enslaved to passion, Hobbes seems to think that most people barely use reason, at least in politics. True, the Elements of Law states that most people have enough ‘natural logic’ to spot errors of reasoning (EL 5.11, 38). But it adds that men are prone to ‘fallacy in reasoning’ (EL 5.14, 39). Perhaps it is easier to see when arguments go wrong than to construct new contributions. Certainly, Leviathan is emphatic that aside from basic mathematics and logic, most people hardly use reason in politics at all (L 5.18-19, 36). Indeed, the civil war happened because almost no one understood his duties to the sovereign (BH 4; see also DP 15). If a man’s reason is dormant in politics, it cannot clash with his passions.
Second, Hume is discussing the passions in general, and many interpreters anachronistically impute the same to Hobbes. Crucially, though, Hobbes never implies that reason serves dangerous passions such as vainglory or ambition. (On ambition and vainglory, see especially Baumgold 1988: 71-4, 78, 122-4; Slomp 2000: 35-44, 58-73, 85-96.) Far from it. If reason works properly, it will tell us that following such passions may create a state of nature. Reason is not, and ought not to be, the servant of passions such as vainglory or ambition. Combining these two differences between Hobbes and Hume, we see that passions such as vainglory and ambition are widespread not because reason is their slave but because reason is so rare. 
So, while Hobbes and Hume see reason as motivationally inert, describing this as slavery is highly misleading for Hume and mountainously misleading for Hobbes.


4.2. “Scouts and Spies” 
Many scholars who see Hobbesian reason as enslaved to the passions depend at least partly on Hobbes’s comment that “the Thoughts, are to the Desires, as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things desired” (Baier, Darwall, De Jouvenel, George, Herzog, Mabbott, Malcolm, Rahe, Rhoads, Sullivan, and Wrong). Even some scholars who do not see the passions enslaving reason read this comment as showing that passions guide the mind (Pettit 2008: 17; Schmitter forthcoming: section 19.3.3; see also Murphy 2000: 267). 
I believe that the “Scouts and Spies” comment is widely misunderstood due to being quoted out of context. Read in context, it is very mundane. Let us start at the beginning of Leviathan chapter 8. Hobbes describes intellectual virtues and defects, like “quicknesse” or “Dullnesse”, or whether one has a “steddy direction” in one’s thought. Two key ideas are “Fancy”, which is the ability to see similarities between objects, and “Judgement”, which is the ability to see differences. Hobbes believes that fancy can disguise truth, and tends to dominate in rhetorical orations of praise or blame, where “the designe is not truth, but to Honour and Dishonour .... In Demonstration [i.e. proof], in Councell, and all rigourous search of Truth, Judgement does all” (L 8.1-10, 50-2). This is part of Hobbes’s revisionist approach to rhetoric (Skinner 1996: 363-75).
Having discussed these natural wits, Hobbes briefly mentions acquired wit – an intellectual faculty “acquired by method and instruction” – of which “there is none but Reason .... But of Reason and Science, I have already spoken in the fifth and sixth Chapters” (L 8.13, 53). 
It sounds as if Hobbes intends to say no more about reason in chapter 8. Indeed, natural wit is all that he discusses when he turns straight away to the causes of differences in wit. These causes lie “in the Passions”, principally “Desire of Power”, and its subsidiary desires, “of Riches, of Knowledge, and of Honour”. This is because 

a man who has no great Passion for any of these things ... cannot possibly have either a great Fancy, or much Judgement. For the Thoughts, are to the Desires, as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things desired: All Stedinesse of the minds motion, and all quicknesse of the same, proceeding from thence. For as to have no Desire, is to be Dead: so to have weak Passions, is Dulnesse (L 8.16, 53-4). 

Recall that “Stedinesse”, “quicknesse” and “Dullnesse” were the first things Hobbes discussed under natural wits, and that fancy and judgement too are natural wits. 
As I see it, then, the Scouts and Spies passage says nothing about reason. It is implausible to read this passage as describing how reason finds a way to what the passions desire (a view I too once held). Hobbes never equates reason with “thoughts”, so it is odd to interpret this comment as reason finding its way to the things desired. The same applies to chapter 3’s comment that “From Desire, ariseth the Thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that which we ayme at” (L 3.3, 21). Rahe treats this as involving reason (1994: 141-2), but “Thought” is not necessarily reason, and what Hobbes is describing sounds like memory, not reason.
In the context of the whole chapter, then, the Scouts and Spies comment merely means that passions influence non-ratiocinative thinking (especially fancy and judgement, and quickness, slowness or steadiness of thinking), and when we desire something we may end up thinking about it even when we start by thinking about something else. Leviathan chapter 3 describes a similar process – someone who started by thinking of the civil war and ended by thinking of “the value of a Roman Penny”: the thought of civil war led to the thought of betraying the King, which led to the thought of betraying Jesus, which led to the thought of 30 pennies, which led to the thought of the value of a Roman penny. This “wild ranging of the mind” happens “in a moment of time” (L 3.3, 21) – in an instant. In Leviathan chapter 8, the difference is that the thoughts jump to something which is desired, not merely to something connected almost randomly to something else. 




4.3 Regulated trains of thought
Hobbes’s this discussion of regulated thoughts in Leviathan chapter 3 also supports my reading of chapter 8. Chapter 3 is, in my view, wrongly used by Rahe (1994: 144) and Coleman (2000: 154-5) to justify their interpretation of the passions enslaving reason. 
Chapter 3 discusses trains of thought “regulated by some desire”, a “Passionate Thought, to govern and direct those [thoughts] that follow, to it self, as the end and scope of some desire, or other passion” (L 3.3-4, 20-1; see also L 8.3, 50). There are two kinds of regulated thoughts: looking back from something to its causes, and looking forward from something to its effects. Hobbes’s example of regulated thinking about causes is a man who has lost an object: “his mind runs back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where, and when he had it”, so as to help him search for it. Hobbes’s example of regulated thinking about effects is someone who “desires to know the event [i.e. effect] of an action”, and sees a chain of thoughts based on experience. Someone who wants to know what will become of a criminal, for example, may have the following train of thoughts: “The Crime, the Officer, the Prison, the Judge, and the Gallowes” (L 3.7, 22). This example was politically salient: crime and punishment were major 17th century concerns (Veall 1970). Hobbes gives many examples of crime leading or not leading to punishment: the latter could foster a state of nature (Blau 2009: 608-11). Not coincidentally, his main political texts all exemplify deliberation in terms of crime (EL 4.7, 32; DC 13.16, 152; L 3.7, 22).
Crucially, Hobbes seems to talk in two different ways about desires regulating thoughts. The man wants to regain the object he has lost, and this desire regulates his train of thoughts about where he might have lost the object. “From Desire, ariseth the Thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that which we ayme at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean; and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our own power” (L 3.4, 21). 
But when Hobbes mentions the man who “desires to know ... what wil become of a Criminal”, this does not sound like it is the criminal himself who is thinking: it sounds more like an onlooker, or even a citizen who is simply pondering the effects of crime. Hobbes says something very similar elsewhere: if we often see crimes followed by punishment, when we see a crime we will expect punishment (EL 4.7, 32). Hobbes does seem to deny that this is part of deliberation, which he restricts to thinking about whether to do something or not (LNC 357; see also 33), but he probably saw this as part of regulated trains of thoughts more generally (see e.g. L 7.1-2, 47).
This is akin to my interpretation of the scouts and spies passage, where the thoughts “find their way to the thing desired”. In chapter 3, “the thing desired” may be nothing more than a prediction: curiosity about what will happen to a criminal sparks off a train of thoughts about the likely consequences, whether in the mind of a potential criminal, an onlooker, or a citizen thinking about what happens to thieves. Our own interests need not be at stake. Passion is only relevant here in that the desire to know an answer starts a train of thoughts. This is much less dramatic than the idea that reason is enslaved to the passions. Reason is no more relevant to chapter 3 than to chapter 8. 
So, here and in the scouts and spies passage, Hobbes seems to say that desires effect thought: they start us thinking. The desire to see a James Bond film, or to know what happens to criminals, sparks off further thoughts. This is a long way from the passions impelling reason to compute means to desired ends, an idea I now consider in more detail. 


4.4. Reason as instrumental 
Many writers implicitly or explicitly treat reason as instrumental, finding means to desired ends. Unsurprisingly, these writers often see reason as the slave of the passions: Bertman (1976: 535), Binmore (2008: 4), Darwall (1995: 15, 58-79), George (2008: 178-9), Hampton (1986: 34-42), Mabbott (1953: 113), Malcolm (2002: 30), Parsons (1982: 96; see also 88, 97-8), and Rahe (2008: 311, 314). Other writers depict Hobbesian reason as instrumental without mentioning slavery: Airaksinen (1993: 89, 99), Bobbio (1993: 44, 119-21), Irwin (2008: 156), Johnston (1986: 54), Krom (2011: 36, 47, 68-9, 72-3, 77, 101), Larmore (1998: 1164), Martinich (2012: 215-7), Slomp (2000: 42), and Wright (2006: 17-18,72). 
Malcolm (2002: 15) summarises the instrumental interpretation of reason well:

The reduction of “reason” to instrumental reasoning [in The Elements of Law] was an important part of [Hobbes’s new] psychological picture. Reason, on this view of things, did not intuit values, but found the means to ends that were posited by desire; desires might be various, but reason could also discover general truths about how to achieve the conditions (above all, the absence of anarchic violence) in which desires were least liable to be frustrated.

These writers are all correct that for Hobbes, reason shows us how to avoid what we most dislike – violent death – by following the laws of nature, by adopting monarchy not democracy, and so on. Some writers make this point by drawing erroneously on Leviathan chapters 3 and/or 8 (Rahe 1994: 141-2; Coleman 2000: 154-5; Malcolm 2002: 30; Sullivan 2004: 93-4). But Hobbes is not really discussing reason there. Nonetheless, reason’s instrumental component is evident elsewhere.
However, some interpreters emphasise reason’s instrumental nature at the expense of its deductive nature. Charles Larmore refers to “the notion of ‘right reason’, by which [Hobbes] meant choosing the most efficient means to given ends” (1998: 1164). George Wright barely mentions ratiocination, and writes that “reason for Hobbes is instrumental in essence, scarcely distinguishable from the cunning and skill of the animals” (Wright 2006: 72; see also 17-18). Binmore and Parsons are particularly misleading: anachronistically reading Hobbes through the lens of rational choice theory, they ignore Hobbesian reason’s fundamentally deductive nature. 
I would say, rather, that reason is deductive and can be instrumental. This is the position of Airiksanen, Bobbio, Johnston, Malcolm and Martinich. As Mark Murphy writes, “reasoning, in Hobbes’s sense, is not essentially an exercise in means-end thinking: all that is essential to reasoning is that it involves the deducing of consequences that follow necessarily from sentences constructed out of well-defined general terms” (2000: 261; emphasis added). Deigh is even more emphatic that reason is not essentially instrumental (1996: 50, 53-4; 2003, 103-4). Bernard Gert also denies that Hobbesian reason is essentially instrumental, but he bases this on Hobbes’s comment about madness (2001: 244-5, 255), which is an oddly incidental way of reaching a conclusion for which there is ample textual support elsewhere.
Four important qualifications must be added to this view that reason can be instrumental. First, as already noted, Hobbes does not imply that reason finds means to all passions: he never describes people using reason for ambitious or vainglorious ends, say. Such people are not using reason. It is misleading to talk about Hobbesian reason being instrumental to the passions (i.e. all passions), because reason tells us not to follow some passions. The deductive side of reason can trump its instrumental character, which further shows that reason is not essentially instrumental. Admittedly, Hobbes occasionally depicts geometrical reason as instrumental to our desires (e.g. L 46.1, 458). But this is not a necessary relationship (e.g. L 5.1-2, 31-2; 9.1, 60). 
Second, reason does not find means to ends: it shows which means are better. Reason does not actually discover new options, as misreading of the scouts and spies passage might imply. Experience – mine or someone else’s – tells me what the possible means are, then reason tells me which is best. For example, experience shows that we can tax on the basis of consumption or wealth, and reason supports the former (EL 28.5, 174; DC 13.10-11, 147-8; L 30.17, 238-9). True, someone must first have had the idea to tax wealth, but I cannot see that Hobbes’s account of reason does or could include such creative insights. His account of reason is incomplete in other ways too (Blau 2013, 75-6).
Third, it is more helpful to think about consequences than means. Although Hobbes sometimes describes reason finding “means to ends” (e.g. LNC 188-9), it is more accurate to say that reason reveals the consequences of different actions, especially by showing the undesirable consequences of some things that we like, and the desirable consequences of some things that we dislike. Such claims are of course equivalent to means and ends. For example, we may like democracy, but it is a bad means for avoiding a state of nature (EL 24.3-8, 138-41; DC 10.6-19, 119-26; L 19.4-9, 131-3). Talking about consequences, though, makes clearer what reason is doing, and is of course also true to Hobbes’s language. 
Fourth, reason only works instrumentally in some people. Hobbes believes that most people do not ratiocinate in politics (see section 4.1 above). They must choose means by deliberation, using experience and prudence. Even for economic or foreign-policy decisions, say, Hobbes believes that many people deliberate without reason (see section 8 below).
So, writers who talk about reason being instrumental are correct that reason does not pick our ultimate ends, as Kant would argue. But we should carefully qualify any claim that reason finds means to ends provided by passions.


4.5.  Summary: is reason the slave of the passions?
Hobbes does not depict reason as the slave of the passions. True, he and Hume see reason as motivationally inert: only passions move us. But this is not slavery. Reason, operating instrumentally, warns us not to follow passions such as vainglory and ambition. This is not slavery. Nor is it slavery when “appetite perturbs and impedes the operation of reason”. Like other writers at the time, Hobbes describes some appetites as “perturbations” which “frequently obstruct right reasoning” (DH 12.1, 55; 12.3, 56). But if P blocks Q, it does not necessarily mean that Q serves P. The same applies to Hobbes’s comment that “the Understanding is by the flame of the Passions, never enlightened, but dazled” (L 19.5, 131), and his comment about passions hindering reason from uncovering the law of nature (L 26.21, 190-1). I suspect Hobbes means that people rushing to impassioned conclusions do not have time to reason. If P happens so fast that Q cannot happen, though, Q is not enslaved to P.
The basic problem is that the slavery metaphor implies control, which misses Hobbes’s point. However, we might describe reason “serving” the passions if we specify this very, very carefully. It does not happen for most people, for most passions, or for some cases of purely logical or mathematical reasoning. And another caveat is crucial: we should only use “serving” to mean “functioning” or “operating”. Reason cannot serve the passion for self-preservation as slaves serve their owners, but as our senses serve to tell us what is happening. In other words, some people’s reason might function in ways that help certain passions.
We should also take care when talking about passions “mastering” reason. “Mastering” could mean “overcoming”, or “controlling/commanding”, but only the former is apt for Hobbes. His Dialogue on Common Law mentions “the force of an irregular Appetite to Riches, to Power, and to sensual Pleasures”, and “how it Masters the strongest Reason” (DP 12). This clearly involves passions overcoming reason, not influencing it. Note how Hobbes specifies a particular passion, not the passions in general.




5. Are the passions slaves of reason? 
Although I deny that reason serves the passions, I am not arguing that the passions serve reason. I do, however, partly support Gert’s and Skinner’s views on the force of reason. 
Far from reason being enslaved to the passions, writes Gert, “the passions are to be controlled by reason” (Gert 2001: 253). “Hobbes’s view is diametrically opposed to that of Hume”: it is not that reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions, but that “the passions ought to be subservient to reason” – although generally they are so strong that people often act against reason (Gert 2010: 52). So, reason “governs the passions, or tries to, so that its own goal is not threatened” (Gert 2001: 253).
This is too extreme. Reason cannot “control” the passions. It can show how some passions undermine self-preservation, and might thus spark our fear of violent death, but this is not control. In Michael Krom’s words, reason’s role is to “orient” and “guide” the passions towards the right ends (2011: 36, 68). Gert’s overstatement, and his view that reason has a goal, partly reflects his misreading of Hobbes’s comments on “natural reason”. Gert interprets this as the faculty by which we perceive our real good (2001: 248-55; 2010: 49-53). But his interpretation is unconvincing (Martinich 2012: 215-7). For example, Hobbes often talks of “natural” reason merely to contrast it with supernatural revelation (Martinich 2012: 216-7). Nonetheless, Gert is right that Hobbes wants reason to show us that some passions are dangerous.
Skinner also stresses reason’s power over the passions. Skinner is not treating passions as slaves of reason: he would not talk so anachronistically. He Skinner merely argues that the Elements of Law and De Cive are optimistic about reason’s power over the passions, and that although Leviathan is more pessimistic about the power of reason by itself, reason can still triumph when allied with emotive rhetoric (1996: 298-437). 
Skinner’s arguments are mostly persuasive but I believe he overstates reason’s power in two ways. First, his claims about Leviathan’s alliance between reason and rhetoric depend significantly, though not exclusively, on a questionable view of the first four paragraphs of the Review and Conclusion. In these paragraphs, though, Hobbes is mainly citing other people’s opinions (Schuhmann 1998: 123). In my view, these paragraphs do not support Skinner’s thesis as much as he thinks, but nor do they weaken it as much as Schuhmann implies.
Second, I do not find the early texts so positive about reason. Most importantly, Skinner jumps from Hobbes’s comments about the “dictates” of right reason (DC 2.2, 34; 3.19, 51; 3.27, 53; 15.4, 173; 15.15, 181) to “its power to order, command and enforce particular conclusions upon us”, its “inherent capacity to persuade” (Skinner 1996: 302, 347; emphasis added). But “dictates of right reason” could mean two things: (a) reason is a guide, showing us what is good but letting us decide whether to choose it, or (b) reason is a dictator, showing us what is good and making us do it. In Hobbes’s day, both meanings were used. Hooker talks of the dictates of right reason in terms of reason “discovering” what is good, right reason being a “guide” whose advice the will may “take or refuse” as it sees fit (Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity 1.7.4-6, 222-4). But John Donne treats dictamen rectae rationis as something which “binds” us as court decrees bind us (Biathanatos 1.1.6, 51-2; see also James 1997: 191-5). Hobbes’s comments are ambiguous but to me they sound more like Hooker than Donne. Overall, though, Skinner offers an important and compelling retort to the view that Hobbesian reason serves the passions. 


6. Reason and deliberation
To understand reason’s influence on the passions, I turn to deliberation. Anachronisms are rife in scholarly discussions of the relationship between reason and deliberation. Consider Hobbes’s comment that “in all Deliberations, and in all Pleadings, the faculty of solid Reasoning, is necessary” (L R+C 483). This may not be Hobbes’s view at all (Schuhmann 1998: 123), but even if it is, it is not about deliberation. It is misinterpreted in a small but significant way by David Van Mill (2001: 105), Hannah Dawson (2007: 278) and Laurens van Apeldoorn (2012: 163): Van Mill and Dawson do not mention “Pleadings”, i.e. legal speeches, and all three writers imply that Hobbes is talking about mental deliberation. But “Deliberations, and … Pleadings” invokes a standard debate in Hobbes’s day, about rhetoric in public assemblies and in law courts respectively (Skinner 1996: 352). “Deliberations” here means group discussion in parliaments.
John Rawls (2007: 61) and David Van Mill (2001: 49-55, 89-90) sometimes use Hobbes’s notion of deliberation, but elsewhere they use anachronistic, modern notions of deliberation – the careful consideration of different options (Rawls 2007: 45, 50, 54, 58-63, 66, 69; Van Mill 2001: 80, 89, 92; see also Zagorin 2007: 255). This makes deliberation sound like ratiocination. But once we work out which comments by Rawls and Van Mill involve their notion of deliberation rather than Hobbes’s, such interpretations are legitimate: Hobbes wants citizens to make reflective, peace-abiding decisions, not people recklessly following whatever impulse strikes them. 
Anachronisms, however, lead to much more troubling misinterpretations by Martin Hollis and Robert Sugden (1993: 2), Michael Losonsky (2001: 53-4) and Christopher Tilmouth (2007: 234-53). Most egregiously, in Hollis and Sugden’s rational-choice reading of Hobbes, conflicting appetites lead to deliberation, which Hobbes never says; reason then helps us choose between these conflicting appetites, which Hobbes never says; and this  process is called “deliberative reason”, a term Hobbes does not and would not use. This is not just anachronistic; it is simply wrong.
So, what does Hobbes believe? My interpretation, which follows Darwall, Gauthier and Hampton, is that ratiocination occurs before deliberation and hence can inform and improve it by altering the images and opinions to which our passions respond when we deliberate. According to Hampton, “reason’s only role in the deliberative process is to help determine how to achieve a goal set by desire” (1986: 19). As Gauthier writes, “reason aids deliberation by showing us the means to obtain, or to avoid, what we will” (Gauthier 1969: 11). (This is all compatible with rational choice theory, incidentally. My concern is not with anachronism itself, or with rational-choice readings of Hobbes, but with anachronistic rational-choice readings which happen to misread Hobbes.)
Gauthier states, rightly, that Hobbes is not clear about the relationship between reason and deliberation, so we should read between the lines (1969: 12). Warrender, by contrast, thinks that the issue is clear-cut, and suggests that the evidence favours deliberation being ratiocinative: Hobbes depicts deliberation as having a reflective element “[m]ore often” than he depicts it in purely appetitive terms (1957: 267). In fact, Warrender only gives one reference to support this, and I will suggest that it does not actually support the view that reason occurs in deliberation. (The same applies, I believe, to most of the evidence presented by van Apeldoorn [2012], who presents a much more rigorous and exhaustive defence of this view than Warrender.) The passage Warrender refers to is the following one:

(1)	because in Deliberation, the Appetites, and Aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evill consequences and sequels of the action whereof we Deliberate; the good or evill effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences … so that he who hath by Experience, or Reason, the greatest and surest prospect of Consequences, Deliberates best himself; and is able when he will, to give the best counsel unto others (L 6.57, 46).

Hobbes makes similar points without mentioning reason or deliberation (EL 7.6, 7.8, 44-5; LNC 194), but for present purposes we should focus on three similar passages which address reason only, not deliberation. One passage discusses taxes:

(2)	all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses (that is their Passions and Selfe-love,) through which, every little payment appeareth a great grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses, (namely, Morall and Civill Science,) to see a farre off the miseries that hang over them (L 18.20, 129).

Another discusses the laws of nature:

(3)	Reason teaches that peace is good; it follows … that all necessary means to peace are good, and hence that modesty, fairness, good faith, kindness and mercy … [are] virtues. … [But m]en cannot divest themselves of the irrational desire to reject future goods for the sake of present goods (DC 3.31-2, 55-6).

And the last discusses emotions:

(4)	Emotions … frequently obstruct right reasoning. … [T]hey militate against the real good and in favor of the apparent and most immediate good, which turns out frequently to be evil when everything associated with it hath been considered. For though judgment originates from appetite out of a union of mind and body, it must proceed from reason [Consilium autem a Ratione sit]. Therefore, although the real good must be sought in the long term, which is the job of reason, appetite seizeth upon a present good without foreseeing the greater evils that necessarily attach to it. (DH 12.1, 55; DHL 12.1, 67).

The Gert edition’s translation of passage 4 – judgement “must proceed from reason” – does not capture Hobbes accurately. Hobbes is saying that judgement starts in deliberation but that reason gives judgement “counsel”. Gert’s “must” is also too strong.
	Passages 2 to 4 are saying that reason helps us see further along the chain of consequences. You may desire democracy, but reason proves that monarchy is more stable (EL 24.3-8, 138-41; DC 10.6-19, 119-26; L 19.4-9, 131-3). You may love giving rhetorically emotive speeches in parliament, but reason demonstrates that they cause discord (DC 10.12, 123-4; L 25.15, 181). You may think that taxation should be proportional to wealth, but reason shows that taxation which is proportional to consumption is less likely to lead to a state of nature (EL 28.5, 174; DC 13.10-11, 147-8; L 30.17, 238-9). We can read passage 1 along the same lines: reason reveals these consequences (and experience may already have shown the same).
Reasoning about such matters means that when you next deliberate on them, you will see consequences you had not considered before. In the above examples, an image of the state of nature will flash into your mind, and your deliberation may lead you to act in ways more conducive to peace. 
In these examples, reason literally alters the imagination. By showing you different consequences, different images arise in your mind. As Darwall (2000: 331-2) puts it, reason can improve deliberation by showing us the consequences of our actions and hence “revis[ing] the appearances that momentary passions produce.” A different passion may thus end up as the will. Before using reason, your passion for democracy might spark images in your head of orators debating nobly in public forums; if you deliberate about whether to support Parliament or King Charles, you will choose the former. After using reason, thinking of democracy also makes you think of the state of nature. Seeing democracy’s dangerous consequences may cause your fear of violent death to overcome your passion for democracy. 
These examples involve empirical consequences. Reason can also alter the imagination by showing logical consequences. (Hobbes does not distinguish these two satisfactorily: see Kavka 1986: 8.) For example, if you think that theft can be right, reason shows you that by definition it is not (DC 18.4, 237). Recall that according to Hobbes, definitions produce images in the mind (DCO 6.15, 84). 
We can also think of reason altering opinions and doctrines, as emphasised by Richard Tuck and Sharon Lloyd. Reason cannot directly alter passions, which are “reason-resistant” (Lloyd 1992: 41). But some passions only arise because of pre-existing beliefs (Tuck 1989: 56-7; 1998: 151-5; 2004: 132). Reason can alter beliefs, and different passions will arise. Hobbes thus seeks to educate men by changing their opinions, especially religious ones (Lloyd 1992: 99-157). He often attacks faulty opinions and urges sovereigns to inculcate favourable ones (EL 10.8, 62-3; 27.4-10, 164-9; 17.9, 96; 28.8, 176; DC 12.1-8, 131-7; 13.9, 146-7; L 29.6-14, 223-6; 30.3-14, 232-7; 46.12, 462; DCO 1.1, 2; DH 13.3, 65; BH 3, 16, 56, 62, 64; DP 12; HEC 445-7). 
Hobbes sometimes describes education in terms of ‘imprinting’ (Bejan 2010: 618). Extending the analogy, we can see Hobbesian education as a process of changing the images and words in the book of deliberation: an individual considering an anti-social act cannot help but turn over the pages and see a state of nature at the end of the chapter.




7. Real and apparent goods
In my view, to understand the relationship between reason and the passions we must address the distinction between real and apparent goods, which is explicit in passage 4 above, and implicit in passages 1 to 3. 
For Hobbes, an action’s goodness or badness depends on the goodness or badness of the ‘whole chain’ of consequences that follow from the action. Many people do not see to the end of the chain – especially to self-preservation, the greatest good. So, not everything which appears to be good really is good (EL 7.8, 45; LNC 194; L 6.57, 46; DH 11.5-6, 48; 12.1, 55). Hobbes’s comments on apparent goods are not entirely clear or consistent (see especially DH 11.5, 48), so I will follow his usage in passage 4 above: an apparent good is anything which seems to be good, and many apparent goods threaten our real good, self-preservation.
To take Hobbes’s own example (L 18.20, 129) a tax-avoider only sees the pleasure he will get from keeping or spending his money and does not realise that tax-avoidance facilitates a state of nature, threatening his life. Avoiding taxes is an apparent good, for him, but it is not a real good.
	This suggests that “reason versus passion” is less accurate for Hobbes than “passion versus passion”. The key contrast is between our passion for our real good and our passion for those apparent goods which foster a state of nature. Reason supports our passion for our real good, and it supports our passion for those apparent goods which do not hinder our real good; reason opposes those passions for apparent goods which undermine our real good. True, reason does not want us to act purely on impulse: “reason versus any passion”, or “reason for some passions and against others”, does characterise Hobbes’s position correctly, as Gert, Rawls and Van Mill show. But Hobbes could not coherently say that we should follow our reason rather than our passions: by definition we always follow our passions. We do not choose between reason or passion, but between passions.
So far I have skated over a profoundly important issue: would we pick our real good or an apparent good when the two clash? There are five options:

(a)	Hobbes thinks that people always pick their apparent good;
(b)	Hobbes thinks that people always pick their real good;
(c)	Hobbes thinks that whether people pick their real or apparent good depends on one or more other factors (e.g. the presence of rhetoric);
(d)	Hobbes gives different answers to this question;
(e)	Hobbes does not have an answer to this question at all.

Note that “Hobbes’s position” may refer to his conscious intended meaning and/or the implication of what he wrote.
I would confidently reject (a). Hobbes believed that reason could lead at least some people to pick their real good at least some of the time (see section 5). I would probably reject (b), given Hobbes’s comment that some passions can overcome “the strongest Reason” (DCL 12). But I am not confident about which of (c) to (e) is correct. My uncertainty partly reflects Hobbes’s ambiguity. Consider his comment that “the Passions of men, are commonly more potent than their Reason” (L 19.4, 131). This could mean that (i) in most but not all men, passions are stronger than reason, or (ii) in all men, passions are usually but not always stronger than reason. These interpretations imply very different things about reason’s power. Interpretation (i) could imply that reason, if present, will overcome passion, but that reason is usually absent and passions usually triumph. Interpretation (ii) suggests that even where reason is present it needs another, rarer factor to overcome passions. I suspect that interpretation (i) is right but I am not sure, and I have not rejected Skinner’s position: interpretation (ii) applies in Leviathan, interpretation (i) applies earlier.
Consider too the comment that “appetite perturbs and impedes the operation of reason”, and “frequently obstruct[s] right reasoning” (DH 12.1, 55). This could mean at least three things: (i) appetite can prevent ratiocination from even starting; (ii) appetite allows ratiocination to start but can distort it, preventing it from reaching correct conclusions; or (iii) appetite allows ratiocination to reach correct conclusions but can prevent ratiocinators from acting on those conclusions by impelling them to follow short-term goods. Interpretations (i) and (ii) are consistent with reason trumping passion if reason can work properly. Interpretation (iii) is not. I suspect that interpretation (i) is right but I am not sure. 
There are many similar ambiguities. And perhaps Hobbes did not have a definite stance on this matter. The situation is complicated further if we ask “whose reason? whose passions?” Is someone more likely to follow reason if it is his own reason than if it is someone else’s reason? Hobbes’s position here too is unclear. 




8. Reason: counsellor of the passions
The analogy I will offer – cautiously – is that reason counsels the passions. Hobbes talks in similar terms: in section 6 above, passage 1 describes reason helping us give counsel to others, and passage 4 describes reason counselling judgement. 
Counsel gets relatively little emphasis from Hobbes scholars, two valuable exceptions being Skinner (1996: 69-74, 343-6, 349, 373-4) and Sommerville (1996: 248-55, 262, 264-5). Yet counsel was hugely important in Hobbes’s day. Civic humanists advocated the vita activa (active civic life) where the vir civilis (civic man) advised rulers about the common good (Guy 1993: 13-22; Skinner 1996: 66-87). But from the 1620s to the 1640s, there were furious disagreements over who should counsel King James and King Charles. Many parliamentarians wanted this role and attacked the poor guidance offered by counsellors such as Buckingham; royalists resented this parliamentary interference (Gardiner 1906 xvii-xviii, xxix-xxxii, xxxv, xxxix). 
Hobbes clearly saw counsel as highly important and alludes to these issues from the introduction to his translation of Thucydides onwards (EW 8, xvi-xvii; AW 38.16, 476; EL 13.5, 76; 17.8, 96; 19.5, 105; 21.5, 120; 24.4, 139; 24.8, 140-1; 27.12-15, 169-72; DC 5.5, 71; 6.18, 88; 10.9-15, 122-5; 12.10, 138; L 8.11, 53; 17.9-10, 119-20; 19.4-8, 131-2; 25, 176-82; 30.25-7, 242-3; B 2-3, 23, 82, 109). He saw civic humanism as politically destabilising and even says that “the sole cause” of “our land’s present civil wars” was that “certain evil men who were not asked for counsel thought that their own wisdom was less fairly valued and counselled the citizens to take up arms against the king” (AWL 38.16, 424 – my translation, modified from AW 38.16, 476). It is no surprise that his main political texts cover counsel so exhaustively.
Interestingly, Hobbes appears to accept counsel based on reason and counsel based on experience. Leviathan chapter 25, in particular, ideally wants a counsellor to use “firme ratiocination” to “deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and tye himselfe therein to the rigour of true reasoning” (L 25.6, 177; 25.12, 179; see also L 25.3, 176). But Hobbes is also explicit that counsel can come from experience (L 25.11, 179; 25.13, 180), and twice compares counsellors to the memory of the body politic (L Introduction.1, 9; 25.11, 179) – memory being the source of experience (L 3.7, 22). 
Hobbes, it seems, permits both sources of counsel: some counsellors use experience, others use reason. It may be no coincidence that in passage 1, good counsel requires foresight through experience or reason, not experience and reason. Experience and reason are different ways of foreseeing the consequences about which we deliberate. (But they are not totally separate: as section 4.4 noted, experience can show us our options, reason then proves which is better.)
Reason and experience involve two kinds of knowledge: reason’s deductive knowledge is “the Knowledge required in a Philosopher”; experience’s knowledge of facts is “Sense and Memory”, as in historical writing (L 9.1-2, 60; see also DH 10.4, 41). Behemoth, Hobbes’s history of the civil war, can perhaps be seen as experience-based counsel. It is not illegitimate to say that Behemoth uses Hobbes’s experience, and the experience of the history books on which he drew, to improve readers’ historical memory about the consequences of ignorance of duty (B 4). 
But Leviathan chapter 25 does seem to prefer reason-based counsel, and we can read the Elements, De Cive and Leviathan as reason-based counsel for sovereigns. Frederick Whelan notes that in Leviathan chapter 30 “Hobbes evidently is offering counsel to the sovereign” (1981: 68). Chapter 30 covers the sovereign’s duties, and there are equivalent chapters in the Elements and De Cive (EL 28, 172-7; DC 13, 142-52; L 30, 231-44). Yet Hobbes offers far more counsel than this: the laws of nature show how to avoid violent death, and Hobbes guides sovereigns on education, religion, foreign policy, political institutions, crime, taxation, and so on. Hobbes is rightly prized as a political philosopher abstractly discussing issues such as obligation and rights, but he also gives practical, concrete advice on political and social reform. Many Hobbes scholars focus on how to escape the state of nature, but Hobbes himself wrote far more about how to avoid its return. I explore Hobbes’s practical politics elsewhere (Blau forthcoming).
In saying that reason counsels the passions, I am not denying experience’s role here. Nor am I implying that this is all reason does: for example, purely deductive reason in mathematics is not counselling the passions. And reason-based counsel works both directly and indirectly. For example, when Hobbes commends consumption taxes, he is both counselling readers’ passions by altering the images about which they deliberate, and, for the longer term, showing how to sidestep the dangerous passions which wealth taxes can arouse. 
So, I talk cautiously of reason counselling the passions: no short formula accurately captures the complex relationship between reason and the passions. We could perhaps describe reason counselling judgement, as Hobbes himself writes in passage 4 above. But Hobbes talks of judgement in at least three different ways: the ability to see differences (EL 10.4, 61-2; L 8.3, 50-1), the last opinion in non-ratiocinative thinking about matters of fact (L 7.1, 47), and any kind of decision (e.g. L 29.6, 223). So, we cannot be too emphatic about what Hobbes means by reason counselling judgement. We could also talk of reason counselling deliberation, but it surely makes more sense to describe reason counselling the passions by providing the images and opinions on which they work in deliberation. 




	This chapter’s key claims about Hobbes’s position are as follows:

1)	Reason is essentially deductive. It involves making logically valid inferences from clearly defined concepts.
2)	Reason is not essentially instrumental. It is essentially deductive and can be instrumental, showing us the consequences of different choices.
3)	Reason is not the slave of the passions. 
4)	The passions are not the slave of reason either. 
5)	The key conflict is not between reason and the passions but between our real good and some apparent goods. In practice, the key conflict is often between our passion for self-preservation and passions such as vainglory and ambition.
6)	Reason, operating before deliberation, can inform deliberation by altering imagination and opinions. Fear of violent death is thus more likely to be the final appetite in deliberation.
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